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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Wilder v. Prokop, 846 F.2d 613
Wilder, a federal employee, appeals the dismissal of a complaint
concerning his removal. The court of appeals held (1) that jurisdiction
was proper in the district court, and (2) agency refusal to waive filing
deadline for appeals of personnel decisions was within its discretion,
and not arbitrary nor capricious, in the absence of a special showing of
good cause for the filing delay.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Parcel Service, 860 F.2d
372
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued ap-
pellee, United Parcel Service (UPS), on behalf of Jerome Patterson and
similarly situated black males who suffer a disfiguring skin condition
whose sole treatment is to refrain from shaving. Pursuant to UPS's "no
beard" policy, Patterson, a UPS employee, was told to shave. After the
EEOC filed suit, Patterson settled with UPS. The district court granted
summary judgment for UPS holding that the EEOC lacked standing be-
cause it no longer represented an actual injured party.
The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the district court errone-
ously concluded that the EEOC must proceed on behalf of an actual
injured party when challenging a discriminatory policy under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC is not required to act
through an individual in order to vindicate the public interest. The
EEOC's right to proceed endures until the alleged discrimination is
eradicated.
Brown v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Utah, Inc., 850 F.2d 631
Claimant alleges that her former employer discharged her from her
position because of her gender and her complaint of discriminatory
treatment. In addition, she claims the appellees breached her employ-
ment contract by failing to comply with termination procedures pursu-
ant to their personnel manual.
The panel affirmed the trial court's finding that appellees did not
discharge claimant for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons but had
breached the contract. However, the panel concluded that damages
were improperly calculated. The panel stated that if claimant's dis-
charge resulted from unsatisfactory job performance, she was entitled to
back pay and reasonable front pay. However, if the lack of work claim-
ant was qualified to perform was the determinative factor in her dis-
charge, the appellee's breach did not damage claimant. Thus, the panel
remanded to determine whether claimant is entitled to damages.
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Summers v. State Farm, 864 F.2d 700
Appellant Summers appeals the district court's decision to grant
State Farm's motion for summary judgment on his claims of wrongful
termination because of age and religion. Affirmed.
Summers worked for State Farm as a field claims representative un-
til 1982, when he was fired on the stated grounds of poor job perform-
ance and the falsification of company records. Summers, however,
claimed that he had already been disciplined for these problems prior to
his discharge, and that State Farm's stated grounds for firing him were
merely a pretext.
State Farm admitted to the prior disciplining of Summers, but re-
sponded by saying that after Summers was fired, more instances of Sum-
mers' misconduct were found, and that even if Summers was still
employed by State Farm then, he would have been discharged when
these instances were discovered. The court of appeals approved of this
use of "after-acquired evidence," and said that post-termination discov-
eries of misconduct by an employee can be used to deny relief in certain
wrongful termination cases.
Pitre v. Western Electric, 843 F.2d 1262
Janice Pitre brought an action individually, and on behalf of a class,
against appellant Western Electric, alleging gender-based discrimina-
tion in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), after she was de-
moted from section chief. She alleged that Western's all-male
management personnel held discriminatory attitudes which resulted in a
clustering of women in lower salary grades. The district court ruled in
favor of Pitre and the class, and enjoined Western from continuing to
discriminate. The court also awarded damages which included some
back and front pay.
The court of appeals held that the district court properly consid-
ered past discrimination as evidence of Western's intent to discriminate,
since the decision-making process at Western had undergone no change
before the case began. The court further ruled that Pitre had presented
ample evidence of discrimination despite the fact that the small sample
sizes in the case impaired the effective use of statistics.
The damage award was calculated incorrectly. The district court
unintentionally disregarded earnings lost due to the lingering effects of
past discrimination. Front pay is intended to compensate victims of dis-
crimination for the continuing future effects of discrimination until the
victim can be made whole, and is not a substitute for back pay. Further,
the court did not sufficiently consider the effect of past discrimination in
determining how to distribute back pay. Remedy reversed and re-
manded. Liability findings affirmed.
Richardson v. The City of Albuquerque, 857 F.2d 727
Appellant appeals denial of a new trial following: (1) a jury verdict
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for the defendants on Richardson's allegations of wrongful discharge,
breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, outra-
geous conduct, defamation, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 sex, age, and handi-
cap discrimination; and (2) a directed verdict for the defense on her
fourteenth amendment due process claims. Affirmed.
Richardson was a thirty-nine year old female who was admitted into
the Albuquerque police cadet academy in late 1982. A month into the
training program, Richardson was removed from the academy class and
terminated. The stated grounds for this termination were Richardson's
failure to pass certain physical requirements.
Richardson claimed the instructors at the police academy subjected
her to verbal abuse and discriminated against her. Defendants insisted
that verbal harassment was a part of a high stress, military-type training
program, and that women were not treated differently than men because
both had to perform the same job in the field.
Following the jury and directed verdicts, Richardson made a motion
for a new trial on the basis that the jury verdict was against the weight of
evidence. The Tenth Circuit noted this decision was a factual one for
the trial court to make, and that there was no showing of manifest abuse
of discretion in this case. Regarding the directed verdict on the due
process claims, the Tenth Circuit stated that the trial court was cor-
rected in holding that Richardson had no protected property interest in
her probationary position as a police cadet.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sperry Corp., 852 F.2d 503
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought
this action against Sperry Corporation (Sperry), alleging that Sperry im-
properly discharged and then failed to rehire Elizabeth Koyen, in viola-
tion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 et seq. The jury found for EEOC and Koyen at trial, and both par-
ties appealed. The only issue addressed on appeal was whether the dis-
trict court improperly denied Sperry's motions for a directed verdict and
judgment n.o.v.
Koyen, then 54 years of age, took a five-month leave of absence.
Shortly before the end of her leave, she tried to regain her former posi-
tion. When told that the position was filled, she unsuccessfully applied
for other openings at Sperry.
In reviewing the district court's denial of the motion for judgment
n.o.v., the Tenth Circuit instructed that there must be evidence upon
which the jury could properly find a verdict for the nonmovant. More-
over, the panel noted that under the ADEA, plaintiff must prove that age
was a determining factor in defendant's treatment of the complaining
employee. Upon evaluating EEOC's four theories of age discrimination,
weighing every reasonable inference from the facts in evidence in favor
of EEOC, the Tenth Circuit concluded that EEOC did not present suffi-
cient evidence to prove discrimination on any of the theories.
19891
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Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's order
denying Sperry's motion for a judgment n.o.v. and remanded with in-
structions to dismiss the action.
Cooper v. Asplundh, 836 F.2d 1544
Appellee Cooper worked as a foreman for Asplundh from 1966 un-
til he was discharged in 1984. He was 49 years old and replaced by a 32
or 33 year old. He brought this suit alleging Asplundh willfully discrimi-
nated against him in firing him. The jury found for Cooper and the
court entered ajudgement for back pay, liquidated damages, front pay,
and attorney's fees. Both parties appealed.
The issue upon appeal was double damages for willful violation as
opposed to intentional violations. To find willful violation, a factfinder
must find that age was the predominant factor in the employer's decision.
The jury instruction failed to refer to the predominate factor require-
ment so the "willfulness" issues was remanded. Front pay was held rea-
sonable given the animosity between the parties. Reinstatement terms
offered were precluded here. The arbitral award should only be sub-
tracted once, not twice as respondent argued, from the overall award.
Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 858 F.2d 610
Petitioner Phillips appeals from the district court's denial of sum-
mary judgment in this age discrimination suit. Affirmed in part, re-
versed in part.
In March 1982, Phillips announced its plans to close its Kansas City
refinery in six months. As part of its agreement with the employee
union, Phillips agreed to consider Kansas City employees for employ-
ment at Phillips' other facilities where openings existed during the six
month closing period ending on September 9, 1982. The agreement
also stated that the refinery would cease all operations on August 31,
1982 whereupon all remaining employees would be terminated.
On August 31, 1982, Plaintiff Gray filed a charge of age discrimina-
tion against Phillips, as did Plaintiff Walsh on October 15, 1982, claim-
ing that Phillips had denied them an employment transfer due to their
ages. On March 2, 1983, a class action was filed on behalf of all former
employees of the refinery similarly situated. The actions were
consolidated.
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), charges
of discrimination must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the alleged wrongful termina-
tion date. According to the district court, as affirmed by this court, that
date is August 31, 1982. Consequently, the district court held that only
plaintiffs Gray and Walsh had complied with the limitations period, and
that the other plaintiffs had not raised facts sufficient to establish equita-
ble tolling of the 180-day period. However, the district court denied
Phillips' motion for summary judgement on the ground that plaintiffs
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Gray and Walsh were representative of the plaintiffs who had not met
the 180-day limit.
This court reversed, ruling against equitable tolling on the ground
that the EEOC actively mislead plaintiffs into a late filing and that equi-
table considerations mandate that plaintiffs be permitted to proceed
with their claim. As a result, the district court's denial of Phillips motion
for summary judgment is affirmed on the basis of equitable tolling.
Graham v. City of Oklahoma City, 859 F.2d 142
Appellant was terminated from his position as a police officer with
the appellee city because he allegedly falsified a police report. Appellant
sued alleging that his termination violated due process. The lower court
granted summary judgment to the city.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the appellant did
not posses a property interest under Oklahoma law and, consequently,
could not invoke the protections of the fourteenth amendment. This
was because removal from office was conditioned, by the city charter,
soley upon the good of the service. The court held this standard does
not create a legitimate expectation of entitlement to continued employ-
ment with cause for discharge.
Grandchamp v. United Airlines, Inc., 854 F.2d 381
Appellees were employees of appellant airline until they were elimi-
nated from their jobs due to a company reorganization that did not in-
clude their continued services. Both appellees sued for violations of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and for damages result-
ing from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. The lower
court found for the airline with regard to the ADEA claim but found for
the plaintiffs as to the tort claim. The airline appealed the tort claim
judgment.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the tort claim judgment, holding that
under Colorado law, the plaintiffs must show outrageous conduct on the
part of the defendant to support a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The plaintiffs, however, showed nothing more than
that they had not been given new positions based on their age.
Although such conduct is unlawful under the ADEA, the appellees failed
to appeal their ADEA claim. Consequently, their bare age discrimina-
tion claims without any showing of outrageous conduct failed to support
the tort claim.
Branson, et. al. v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768
Appellants Branson and Saccomanno claimed they were discrimina-
torily discharged by appellee Coal Co. because of their age in violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district
court granted the Coal Co.'s motion for summary judgment. Judgment
affirmed.
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The Tenth Circuit found that the employees had established a prima
facie case of age discrimination in connection with the employer's reduc-
tion-in-force by showing that the employer fired qualified older em-
ployees, but retaining younger ones in similar positions. The court
agreed with the district court's determination that the appellants failed
to raise a genuine issue of fact about whether the employer's articulated
reasons for the layoffs were a mere pretext for discrimination. Appel-
lants' mere conjecture that their employer's explanation was a pretext
for intentional discrimination was an insufficient basis for denial of sum-
mary judgment.
Wyoming Laborers Health and Welfare v. Morgen & Oswood, 850 F.2d 613
Trustees of an employee benefit pension and insurance fund sued
employer to recover deliquent contributions. The district court held
that the employer owed a portion of the delinquent contributions
claimed by the trustee, and awarded a double interest penalty on that
amount, auditor's fees, attorney's fees, and costs to the trustees.
Affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the Wyoming ten year statute of limita-
tions for actions based on a written contract was applicable to an action
brought under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act by
trustees of a pension plan to recover delinquent contributions, and that
the doctrine of laches did not bar the action.
Norton v. Worthen Van Service, Inc., 839 F.2d 653
Appellants were and are employees of appellee Worthen Van Ser-
vice, Inc. The employees were required to be on call and available to
drive within fifteen to twenty minutes of notice. Appellants brought this
suit under the Fair Labor and Standards Act (FLSA) seeking unpaid
wages for this waiting time. The district court denied recovery by find-
ing that this waiting time was in accordance with the provisions of the
FLSA, and did not constitute "working time." Affirmed.
Barnard v. Commercial Carriers, Inc., 863 F.2d 694
Appellant Barnard appeals a district court's decision to grant sum-
mary judgment in favor of the appellees, Commercial Carriers, Inc.
(CCI), and Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Local No. 222 (Local 222). Reversed.
Appellees are bound by a multi-employer collective bargaining
agreement. CCI hired appellant Barnard as a yardman in 1980. Later,
he was laid off as a yardman, but was later rehired as a driver. His sen-
iority date of 1980 was retained in spite of his rehiring into a different
position. Grievances were filed by other employees at CCI who pro-
tested Barnard's seniority date. A special subcommittee heard the griev-
ances, in spite of the fact they were not filed within the 30 day period
specified by the collective bargaining agreement. Following a hearing of
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which Barnard was given no notice, the subcommittee decided to
change Barnard's seniority date to a later date.
Barnard filed a grievance with Local 222. The union refused to
hear the grievance, and Barnard subsequently filed this action against
the appellees.
The court of appeals held that the processing of untimely griev-
ances did violate the express terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and that Local 222 breached its duty of fair representation to
Barnard in failing to protest the untimeliness of the grievances. Since
the 30 day time limit had expired, the court held that the subcommittee
lacked the jurisdiction necessary to change Barnard's seniority date. In
addition, the lack of notice to Barnard violated his due process rights.

